Durchsuchen nach
Kategorie: Business Cooperations

What the NBA incident says about the expectations and strategies of Chinese politics

What the NBA incident says about the expectations and strategies of Chinese politics


This blog deals primarily with developments in Chinese football. However, it is worth taking a look beyond the horizon from time to time in order to better understand specific contexts and derive implications for one’s own profession and occupation.

Recently, there was an incident in the American National Basketball Association (NBA) that attracted a lot of attention. What happened? The general manager of the NBA-team Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey, tweeted on October 4 “Fight for Freedom, Stand with Hong Kong”.

Flashback: The Hong Kong protests in 2019 initially formed against a bill by the Hong Kong government, which would allow the extradition of fugitive offenders and convicts to mainland China. The relatively small protests increasingly developed into pro-democracy mass protests, which were publicly directed against the authority of the Chinese central government. The situation escalated as protesters and security authorities began to resort to violence.

Back to the tweet: Morey’s public support of the protests is so sensitive, not only because his club and the NBA have signed lucrative commercial agreements and formed partnerships with mainland China, but also because former Chinese NBA star and current official of the Chinese Communist Party Yao Ming played for the Houston Rockets.

Basketball is not just any other sport in China, but perhaps the most popular game according to a variety of indicators such as broadcasting time, practice across the country, online and offline media reach and levels of commercialisation, even ahead of football. In 2017, for instance, Zhou et al. (2017: 82) wrote that the NBA “has had remarkable success in the Chinese market. From the perspective of sport competition or marketing operations, the NBA’s achievement in China provides a model for other overseas sport leagues”.

However, this success as being considered a “model” for other actors in the realm of sports might be over now, since the reactions to this tweet came promptly and intensely. The spokesperson of the Chinese Consulate General in Houston announced, for instance, in an official statement that they “are deeply shocked by the erroneous comments on Hong Kong made by Mr. Daryl Morey [and] expressed strong dissatisfaction with the Houston Rockets”. Furthermore, the representative urged the NBA team “to correct the error and take immediate concrete measures to eliminate the adverse impact”. What exactly this “correction” meant was unclear at first. But later it was revealed that NBA Commissioner Adam Silver was allegedly asked by the Chinese government to fire Daryl Morey. His answer was: “there’s no chance that’s happening […] there’s no chance we’ll even discipline him”.

Moreover, China’s state television broadcaster CCTV announced that it would suspend broadcasts of the NBA pre-season games and review all agreements with the NBA. Consequently, CCTV did not air the season opener between the reigning champion Toronto Raptors and the New Orleans Pelicans. And, Chinese sponsors such as Mengniu Diary, Anta Sports, and Ctrip.com terminated their deals with the NBA.

After receiving the first negative reactions, Morey deleted his tweet quickly and wrote in response, “I did not intend my tweet to cause any offense to Rockets fans and friends of mine in China”, but the emotional machinery had already been set in motion, and the damage was done. He further added: “I was merely voicing one thought, based on one interpretation, of one complicated event. I have had a lot of opportunity since that tweet to hear and consider other perspectives”. Michael Bass, the Chief Communication Officer of the NBA, distanced himself from Morey’s statements: “While Daryl has made it clear that his tweet does not represent the Rockets or the NBA, the values of the league support individuals’ educating themselves and sharing their views on matters important to them”, meaning that Morey is allowed to form and express his personal ideas and opinions.

However, in Chinese social media, the NBA adopted a slightly different position, stating that they were “extremely disappointed in the inappropriate comment”. The assessment of NBA star LeBron James was similar: “I don’t want to get into a… feud with Daryl Morey but I believe he wasn’t educated about the situation at hand and he spoke […] Just be careful what we tweet… even though, yes, we do have freedom of speech. But there can be a lot of negative that comes with that too”. Sometime later, the first LeBron James jerseys burned in Hong Kong. James’ comments had infuriated many protesters in Hong Kong as they were interpreted as proof that he supported China.

These statements were considered by some people in the US as a Kowtow (磕头, ketou) – a withdrawal from freedom of speech to minimize their own financial losses. For instance, Ted Cruz, the Senator of Texas, tweeted that “[a]s a lifelong @HoustonRockets fan, I was proud to see @dmorey call out the Chinese Communist Party’s repressive treatment of protestors in Hong Kong. Now, in pursuit of big $$, the @nba is shamefully retreating”. He further added: “We’re better than this; human rights shouldn’t be for sale & the NBA shouldn’t be assisting Chinese communist censorship”.

A few years ago, there was a similar incident in football. In 2017, the German Football Association (DFB) signed a series of cooperation agreements with Chinese partners. Following Xi Jinping’s inauguration as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, a “comprehensive” (全面, quanmian) football development strategy was launched in China between 2014 and 2016, including four far-reaching reform programmes. The strengthening of cooperation in the domain of football between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China can be traced back to a proposal made by Chancellor Angela Merkel to President Xi Jinping during her state visit to China in June 2016.

Part of this cooperation agreement was that the Chinese U-20 national team would play against German fourth tier teams to prepare for the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2020. The German teams were to receive €15,000 per game in return. But already after the first match the cooperation was terminated. What happened? After Tibetan human rights activists rolled out Tibet flags during the game, the Chinese players left the pitch in the middle of the first half. After a 25-minute break, the activists had to remove their flags. The incident triggered a debate about freedom of expression in Germany. A senior DFB official commented on the incident as follows: “We cannot ban protests, there is freedom of expression. But we also want to be good hosts. In this respect, we are not happy about these events”. Lu Kang, spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, responded to the incident that the Chinese government is opposing “separatist, anti-China or terrorist activities”.

The Chinese government asked the DFB to ban “anti-China” statements from sporting venues. However, the DFB could not guarantee this. Subsequently, Chinese sponsors in Germany are reported to have announced the termination of collaborations and contracts. When the cooperation was about to fail, the then DFB President Reinhard Grindel visited Beijing to calm the emotions. However, he was not even welcomed at the gates. He therefore had to return to Germany empty-handed.

In comparison, the NBA has much higher bargaining power than the DFB. The advantage of the NBA is that there is de facto no alternative basketball league that enjoys similar popularity in China. The situation is very different in the domain of football. There are enough alternatives to cooperate with well-known brands that compete for access to the lucrative Chinese market. China commentator Bill Bishop described the NBA’s favourable position as follows: “The NBA has leverage in China, if it works as a united front. PRC fans, sponsors, web sites and broadcasters can shun one team, but they can not and will not shun an entire league. Do you really think those fans are going to be satisfied watching CBA [China Basketball Association] games? There would be a social stability cost to banning the NBA in China. I am serious”. For the Chinese Communist Party, nothing stands above domestic social stability.

These incidents and developments illustrate one thing in particular – whether we like it or not – we live in a globalised and interconnected world, where reciprocal influences and interdependencies are increasingly becoming apparent. This means that China’s increased economic strength has a considerable influence on how people deal with their own values, belief systems, and patterns of behaviours. On the other hand, popular foreign (cultural) products and brands in China have an influence on Chinese society despite actively practiced censorship.

The Chinese government expects from its partners in other countries that they protect their interests and proceed with a similar severity against those who deviate from the political line in Beijing. Financial incentives are used deliberately as a strategy to punish perceived misconduct and reward loyal advocates. Foreign stakeholders are thereby played off against each other as far as possible. The formation of common positions towards China is thus made more difficult – not only in the context of sport, but also in other economic and political fields. The Leninist party dictatorship in China seems to be capable of effectively creating an extensive homogenisation of interests and coordinating a corresponding synchronisation of commercial behaviour, which favours this strategic approach and ensures the assertion of Chinese interests in other countries.

The market entry and retreat of Dalian Wanda Group in world football

The market entry and retreat of Dalian Wanda Group in world football

 

On 14th February 2018, Atlético de Madrid announced that its Chinese investor Dalian Wanda Group (DWG) has reached an agreement to sell 17 percent of its 20 percent stake in the Spanish football club for about US$ 50 million. According to the official statement, ‘The decision to divest is part of the global strategy of Dalian Wanda Group’. This strategic reorientation of the Chinese corporation marks a turning point in the international football business.

Chinese economic impact on world football

A few years ago, political reform policies in China to develop national football were followed by increased commercial activities and a high level of capital influx into world football. Several star players under contract at top European clubs were transferred to China for breathtaking amounts. Moreover, Chinese companies started to invest heavily in shares of top-tier European clubs like Manchester City (City Football Group) or acquired them all together, such as the emblematic pair of Internazionale Milan and AC Milan, as well as football-related service companies.

Source: FIFA Transfer Matching System

Regarding the spectacular player transfers to China, Liverpool manager Jürgen Klopp made an interesting comparison. He said in an interview that footballers might go to China for the money, but people in (continental) Europe think the same logic applies to a move to England. Other well-known names of European football, such as Arsene Wenger and Antonio Conte, have not only voiced their concerns about these developments but have portrayed China as a ‘danger’ to European football. The ‘China Threat’ categorisation recalls the statements of the Donald Trump administration in the US, where China is considered not only a ‘whole-of-government threat, but as a whole-of-society threat’.

Wanda’s foray into the international football market

In 2015, DWG acquired a 20 percent stake in Atlético de Madrid, the third most successful club in Spanish football, behind Real Madrid and FC Barcelona, for US$ 52 million. A few weeks later the Chinese company purchased Infront Sports & Media AG, one of the leading sports marketing companies, for about US$ 1.2 billion.

According to Infront’s website, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) has appointed the company as the ‘exclusive sales representative for the distribution of Asian broadcast rights to the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups™ and all other FIFA Events 2015-2022 following an international tender process. The agreement covers 26 countries, including China, Hong Kong India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand.’

The president and chief executive officer of Infront Sports & Media AG is Philippe Blatter, the nephew of former FIFA president Sepp Blatter. In May 2015, Wang Jianlin, the founder of DWG and, according to the ‘Hurun Rich List’ of 2017, one of the wealthiest person in China, and Phillipe Blatter attended the 65th FIFA Congress, where Sepp Blatter was re-elected as FIFA president.

A few days after Blatter’s electoral victory, federal prosecutors in the United States disclosed corruption cases of FIFA officials and persons associated with FIFA. Sepp Blatter was banned for six years by the FIFA ethics committee accordingly since he allegedly approved a payment of about US$ 2 million to Michel Platini, former president of the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). Subsequently, UEFA General Secretary Gianni Infantino was elected as the new FIFA president in 2016.

The corruption allegations had the consequence that some FIFA-affiliated companies such Continental, Castrol, and Johnson & Johnson did not renew their sponsorship contracts. At the same time, DWG became the first Chinese top-level sponsor of FIFA. This agreement was the first commercial deal of Gianni Infantino in his function as FIFA president. On DWG’s website, it is indicated that with the strategic partnership between DWG and FIFA the Chinese company ‘will be better placed to play a role in the bidding process to host major football events such as the World Cup’. The hosting of the FIFA World Cup is one of the dreams of China’s President Xi Jinping.

In an open lecture at Harvard Business School, Wang Jianlin explained the reasons for investing in international football: ‘Our dream is to improve China’s sports industry by adapting to the development of the mainland’s economy and society… If Chinese companies don’t go through the globalisation phase, it’s hard for us to make China powerful or realise the Chinese Dream’. Beyond positioning sport, and football, as drivers of globalisation, this quote also demonstrates that the investment decisions of the corporation are justified by the policy expectations in the era of President Xi Jinping.

Nevertheless, the calculation of DWG did not work out, and the ‘dream’ became a nightmare for the Chinese company.

Wanda under investigation of China’s regulatory bodies

In December 2016, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) issued in a press release that regulatory bodies ‘pay close attention to the recent tendency of some irrational outward investment in the fields of real estate, hotels, cinemas, entertainment industry, and sports clubs.’ DWG has invested in all of these fields.

Source: Thomson Reuters

In March 2017, Pan Gongsheng, deputy governor of China’s central bank and director of SAFE, compared overseas mergers and acquisitions with ‘barbed roses’. He added that many investments in foreign football clubs were ‘irrational‘ since Chinese companies ‘borrowed large sums of money’ and had ‘already a high debt ratio’. In the same month, an American company announced that a proposed acquisition by DWG was cancelled. A few weeks later, Wang Jianlin explained that he was turning his attention back to domestic investments.

A few month later, the China Banking Regulatory Commission launched an investigation into the ‘systematic risk’ presented by some large corporations involved in overseas acquisitions, including DWG and other companies that invested in European football. As a result, shares in Wanda Film Holdings, a subsidiary of DWG, fell by 9.9 percent.

Prior to this, China’s central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan remarked that ‘The experience of the global financial crisis tells us that the first priority is to keep financial institutions healthy so that financial crises could be prevented. We cannot tolerate phenomena such as heavy leverage, low capital and non-performing loans.’ These political interventions may also be connected to the issue that capital outflows via overseas investments have a depreciating pressure on the Chinese currency and might reduce China’s foreign exchange reserves.

According to data released by China’s Ministry of Commerce, from January to June 2017, Chinese overseas investment in culture, sports and entertainment industry dropped by 82.5 percent, accounting for 1 percent of the total overseas investment.

In January 2018, Wang Jianlin promised that DWG will gradually repay all its overseas debt and will not ‘have any credit default anywhere in the world’. The sale of the shares in Atlético de Madrid is, therefore, part of a strategic reorientation of the Chinese company.

China-EU or EU-China Sports Diplomacy?

China-EU or EU-China Sports Diplomacy?

 

Earlier this month (December 2017), the team of China Football 8 was invited to participate in the ‘Seminar on Sport Diplomacy’ in Brussels. The seminar was organised by the Directorate-General for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture of the European Commission, as a follow-up to the High-Level Group on sports diplomacy set up in 2015 by Commissioner Tibor Navracsics in order to elaborate political initiatives and recommendations in this field. The group included active and former athletes, academics, think-tank and media representatives. In an interview with the think-tank ‘Sport et Citoyenneté‘, Mr Navracsics indicated that the High-Level Group’s work might lead to more coordinated efforts by the EU Member States to harness the potential of sport for diplomacy and ‘make the EU a stronger global actor.’

On November 2016, the General Secretariat of the Council issued its conclusions on sports diplomacy. Sport is considered ‘a possible tool in supporting intercultural, economic and political cooperation and understanding between nations and cultures’. Moreover, sport is assigned the ability to ‘shape perceptions in order to support reaching broader foreign policy goals’ and promoting values such as ‘fair play, equality, respect for diversity, integrity, discipline, excellence, friendship, tolerance and mutual understanding which bring different people and countries together.’ Projects related to sports diplomacy should be realised through the EU funding programmes in the area of EU External Relations as well as through the Erasmus+ programme.

Against the background of these developments, the big question is of course: what are the target countries? And within the framework of this blog, the obvious question is whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could be a target country or even a partner of EU sports diplomacy.

According to Professor Thierry Zintz, the Dean of the Faculty of Sports Sciences of the Université Catholique de Louvain and rapporteur of the High-Level Group, sport is a source of cultural soft power. This definition fits very well with the official statements of Mr Xi Jinping, President of the PRC. On October 2017, Mr Xi Jinping delivered a report at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) where he revealed that China’s political leadership will ‘speed up efforts to build China into a powerful sports nation’. To achieve this goal, the CPC ‘will strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges with other countries, giving prominence to Chinese culture while also drawing on other cultures, […] improve our capacity for engaging in international communication so as to tell China’s stories well, present a true, multi-dimensional, and panoramic view of China, and enhance our country’s cultural soft power.’

The concept of soft power has been used and abused in studies about China in recent years. The major problems are the imprecise contextualisation, wording, quantifying and application of this concept. Some argue it is no longer relevant in the context of sport mega-events. Nonetheless, the very vague derivation and interpretation of the concept is also used in the context of the developmental aspirations in Chinese football and the hosting of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics and Paralympic Games.

One month after Mr Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Mr Navracsics and Chinese Vice-Premier Mrs Liu Yandong met on the occasion of the 4th EU-China High-Level People-to-People Dialogue in Shanghai. In this context, the topic of sports was discussed for the first time.

However, the question remains whether China is a target of European sports diplomacy, or whether it is perhaps the other way round! The fact is that there are various cooperation opportunities associated with sports, such as in fields of health, governance, economics, education, etc. Sport in general, and football, in particular, have a multi-dimensional impact on human beings: they attract a lot of attention, trigger emotions and create a strong sense of belonging or rejection, have increasing economic weight, and immediate implications on public health. Sport is indeed a promising avenue for engaging in People-to-People dialogue not only on ‘high level’, but also between sportspeople and citizens.

It remains to be seen whether the diplomatic relations between the EU and China in this specific field will lead to mutual influence and exchange, beyond ‘soft-power’ posturing.

Seminar on Sport Diplomacy (1)

Seminar on Sport Diplomacy (2)

The influence of media on China’s “Soft Power”

The influence of media on China’s “Soft Power”

 

Academic debates about China’s “soft power” are controversial. Internationally renowned scientists such as Joseph Nye and David Shambaugh believe that many efforts of China’s central government aimed at accumulating cultural soft power had only a very limited return on its investments. But this may change now, thanks to the coverage of some influential non-Chinese media outlets.

Today, the Financial Times published an article titled “Beijing’s endgame: football with Chinese characteristics”. The article is mainly about the overdose of Chinese investments in English football clubs. It is argued that these investments are a response to President Xi Jinping’s football reforms, which are a means to boost China’s international influence.

But is this conclusion coherent? Are not the Chinese national team and the domestic league the key to increasing soft power? I’ve heard relatively little about German investors in foreign football clubs – even though the money is there. Nevertheless, football is a very important element of German soft power. The reason for this is obvious: the national team has been sustainably successful for decades and even more appreciated globally since the 2006 World Cup and the Klinsmann/Löw revolution.

In recent years, there has been an inflation of studies about Chinese soft power. Just because there are repeated scientific claims that China possesses (more or less) soft power, it does not mean that this is necessarily the case. From a scientific point of view, one major difficulty is already to quantify soft power. How exactly do you measure it?

What’s even more important (and not discussed in the FT article) is that the term “soft power” is interpreted differently by different scholars, especially in China. While the traditional understanding framed by Nye (1990) considers soft power mainly in the context of international relations, Chinese scholars and policy analysts also apply the concept to the context of domestic politics (Wang/Lu 2008: 445). That’s why we might miss the point in the soft power debates.

However, what I noticed recently is that the constant reporting of non-Chinese media – especially about Chinese football – has resulted in an increased awareness and interest in contemporary China’s popular culture.

What I mean by this is that the issue of Chinese soft power has shifted from a purely academic debate to a widely discussed topic in other fields like European football for example, which may have paradoxically led to China having actually more international influence and, consequently, more soft power.

Even now that you have spent your energy and time reading this text, it may be that I have influenced your perception of the capacity of Chinese soft power. Talking, writing, blogging about Chinese soft power may well turn out to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Football in China: New hub for new technologies in the service of new politics

Football in China: New hub for new technologies in the service of new politics

Recently, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) has announced that it wants to “learn” from the English Premier League, the German Bundesliga and other developed football countries to launch new technologies such as the Video Assistant Referee (VAR) and a professional referee system in 2018. The VARs communicate with the main referee on the pitch and review their decisions to avoid “clear errors”.

VAR in action. The technology was first tested in the USA between two reserve teams of Major League Soccer clubs – New York Red Bulls II and Orlando City B – in August of 2016. (Source: FIFA)

The official motto of the CFA is: “Go out, and please come back” (Zǒu chūqù, qǐng jìnlái). This means that the CFA is promoting international exchanges and encourages Chinese referees to learn from foreign partners. In addition, the CFA is investing in new technologies in order to improve the quality of Chinese referees. This simply means – no more and no less – to transfer know-how to China.

This matter could give the impression that Chinese football is technologically lagging behind in many aspects. This is, however, not correct.

A good example of how advanced the technologies in Chinese football are is demonstrated by a company called Whaley Technology. The company is using the internet and Virtual Reality (VR) technologies to broadcast sports competitions. VR is a computer technology that creates a realistic perception of images, sounds and other sensations by using headsets or other technical devices. The technology simulates the user a physical presence in an imaginary environment. In May 2017, the Chinese Super League (CSL) match between Chongqing Lifan and Henan Jianye was the first football match in China that was broadcasted live with VR technology.

Whaley Technology was founded by Li Ruigang, the chairman of China Media Capital (CMC), in April 2015. According to Bloomberg, CMC is a private equity and venture capital firm that “prefers to invest in the cultural, technology, media, entertainment, consumer, medical treatment, telecommunication, internet, mobile, and middle-class lifestyle sectors” in China and abroad.

In August 2015, CMC partnered with Alibaba Group and Tencent, to invest RMB 2 billion (US$ 304 million) into Whaley Technology, only a few months after the company was founded.

In December 2015, a consortium led by CMC agreed to pay US$ 400 million for a 13 percent minority stake in City Football Group, the owners of Manchester City, among other football clubs. It is therefore not surprising that Manchester City announced in May 2016 that Whaley Technology will become the official TV partner of the club in China.

The user of VR technology can experience stadium atmosphere in the living room.

In April 2016, Ti’ao Dongli, another subsidiary of CMC that acquired the CSL broadcasting rights for five consecutive seasons (2016-2020) for a record of RMB 8 billion (about US$ 1.19 billion), and Whaley Technology announced that they will introduce VR technologies to their football broadcasting business.

In the same month as Whaley Technology has announced that it will introduce VR technologies to their football broadcasting business, the National Development and Reform Commission, a macroeconomic management agency under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, issued a new reform programme called The Medium and Long-Term Development Plan of Chinese Football (2016-2050). In this reform programme, it is required to promote the deep integration of the internet technology with the football industry and to focus on the introduction of the mobile internet, e-commerce, Big Data and other new technologies and formats. All this is only the beginning of a scientific and technological revolution that will dramatically change football, and not only football, it will change our lives.

European Football Clubs Tour China

European Football Clubs Tour China

 

A lot of prominent European football clubs are currently in China. It’s summer break. The competitions in the European leagues have not yet started and the teams are preparing intensively for the coming season.

The weather is usually at this time of the year very hot and sticky in areas like Shanghai, Guangzhou and Tianjin and the time difference is an extra burden, especially for professional players. There is also the fact that European teams mainly play friendlies against each other, since the Chinese teams are in the middle of the season.

The question arises: Why are so many teams taking on the hardships to travel to China during their pre-season preparation?

China is the second largest economy in the world, it has now more than 100 cities of over 1 million residents, and after President Xi Jinping came into office in November 2012, three comprehensive reform programmes to develop football and sports in general in China have been issued. It is therefore only logical that actors of European football consider China first and foremost one of the most promising markets for their own business expansion.

Since 2015, the International Champions Cup (ICC) has been organising friendlies between European football clubs in China. LeTV, one of China’s largest online video companies, teamed up with RSE Ventures, Relevent Sports and Catalyst Media Group to bring ICC to China. According to ICC website, the corporation “is dedicated to full-dimensional premium European football experience for Chinese fans. As a world’s leading pre-season football tournament, ICC China brings along the top European football culture and football lifestyle in China”.

Is it really about bringing European football culture and football lifestyle to China? There is subsequently a more important question: what do they mean with “European football culture” and “football lifestyle”? And: can we even speak of European football clubs when three of the six participating teams are partly (Olympique Lyonnais, Inter Milan) or completely (AC Milan) owned by Chinese investors?

In the field of social sciences it is widely accepted that sport is a powerful facilitator, provider and resource for an array of identities. However, this does not mean that sport should be understood as some kind of self-sufficient social institutions or subsystem, but rather as a constitutive element of everyday life and popular culture, within particular social and historical settings. Football, as one of the most popular mass sports in the world, has a great social, cultural and political impact in (re-)producing collective identities on all levels. The ritualised sporting events became an expression of their imagined communities.

In June 2016, the Suning Holdings Group, one of China’s largest retail business enterprises with more than 1,600 stores, spend €270 million (US$ 307 million) to buy a majority stake of 68.55 percent in European football club Inter Milan. The Suning Holdings Group is based in Nanjing, where the next ICC game will take place on Monday: Inter Milan vs Olympique Lyonnais. For this reason it will probably be a “home game” for Inter.

Welcome

Welcome

 

My name is Ilker Gündogan. I was born in Gelsenkirchen, Germany, in 1988. I am a PhD candidate at the Ruhr-University Bochum and ESSCA School of Management. My current research focuses on China’s football politics and market creation in the era of Xi Jinping. The overarching research question of my dissertation project relates to the understanding of current developments in Chinese football: what are, beyond official and popular narratives, the underlying motivations of the Chinese government to promote football in an unprecedented manner? Or, in a nutshell: why football? And: why now? And what does this case study of the big football reform programme tell us about policy-making in contemporary China, especially with regard to the complementarity of top-down and bottom-up impulses of policy initiation?

This is my first blog post. This blog is featuring both academic reflexions (including from guest contributors) and general information on Chinese football (both in historical and contemporary perspective). The objective of the online presence is to set up, beyond the dissertation project, a small standing group of industry experts, observers and scholars from various disciplines who are interested in working on football in Chinese society, politics and economics and who can bring together their different expertise and methodology in a loose network.

Welcome to China Football 8